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THE DECEPTIVE CERTAINTY OF THE
"LIE DETECTOR"
By SAMUEL L. IGHLEYMAxt
In recent years, an ever-increasing number of commentators in profes-
sional journals and popular magazines have attempted to create the im-
pression that the lie detector is a panacea for the ills that perennially beset
the administration of justice. Thus, the le detector is heralded as a scien-
tific instrument immune from a "lawyer's oratory," and endowed with the
ability to protect the innocent, expose the guilty, expedite justice, reduce
court costs and discourage false clalms.' The machine's professional apolo-
gists claim that it can detect deception better than any other method,2 and
at least one judge is convinced that the lie detector is more trustworthy
than his or the jury's "intuition."'
The conceded coercive power of the lie detector lends credence to such
t BA., 1951, University of Miami (Florida). MA., 1954, University of Miami (Florida).
LL.B., 1957, Yale University. Member of the California Bar.
1 See, e.g., Detzer, Don't Underestimate the Lie Detector, The Reader's Digest, Nov., 1953,
p.49.
2 See lBAu & REID, Lim Dmcnox AND CRnmNAL IN oGATrON 110 (3d ed. 1953)
(hereinafter cited as INBAU & EDD). See also SNYDER, HOMICImE INVESTIGATioN 94-95 (1950) ;
Trovillo, Scientific Proof of Credibility, 22 TEm. L. REV. 743 (1953). The traditional methods
of detecting deception include the rigors of cross-examination and the astute observation of
demeanor. See 2 WIGuORE, EVIDENCE §§ 273-74; 5 WIoGoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1362-68 (3d ed.
1940). For others, see Conrad, Psychiatric Lie Detection, 21 F.R.D. 199, 200 (1958). For an
entertaining description of various types of adverse demeanor, see Bottoms, The Use of a "Lie
Detector" in Marriage Trials, 16 JuRIsT 292, 294 (1956). See also S6DEFRMAN & O'CONNELL,
MODERN CRunxAL INVESTIGATION 31 (1952).
Other methods include the use of scopolamine, sodium amytal and sodium pentathol (the
so-called "truth serums") ; hypnotism; word association tests; observation of pupillary reflex;
recording eye-movements; analysis of chemical content of blood; change in brain wave pat-
terns. These tests, many of which are interrelated, vary considerably in their degree of reli-
ability. For an excellent bibliography of the earlier literature in this field, see Loevinger, Juri-
metrics; The Next Step Forward, 33 Msm-N. L. REv. 455, 485 (1949). See also McCoamcx,
EvImCE §§ 46, 174, 175, 177 (1954); 3 WioROa, EVIDENCE §§ 998-99a (3d ed. 1940); Silving,
Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69 HARv. L. Rrv. 683 (1956) ; Dession, Freedman,
Donnelly and Redlich, Drug-Induced Revelation and Criminal Investigation, 62 YAMs L.J. 315
(1953); Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-Memory, 41
HAuv. L. REv. 860 (1928) ; Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence
-The Competency of Witnesses, 37 Yr L. J. 1017 (1928).
3 Judge Jacob M. Brande apparently reached this conclusion primarily because he failed
to "beat" the lie detector. Detzer, supra note 1. But this approach to fact finding has as much
merit as that of the federal trial judge who revealed he had always counted as a liar any wit-
ness who rubbed his hands while testifying. See Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933) ;
FRANx, CouRTs ON TrAL 335 (1949). And are these devices any worse fact finders than an
emotionally unpredictable jury? For the rationale of a negative answer, see Forkosch, The Lie
Detector and the Courts, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 202 (1939) (hereinafter cited as Forkosch).
E 47 ]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10
an enumeration of merit. Confessions often are obtained from a mere sug-
gestion that the suspect submit to a test,4 and skilled examiners frequently
are able to elicit "voluntary" confessions, often to crimes other than those
being investigated, by tricking a suspect into believing the machine has ex-
posed his guilt.5
It should not be surprising, then, that laymen tend to believe the lie
detector is in fact capable of all that its champions claim. Stores,
6 banks,7
insurance companies8 and industry9 widely utilize the device. 10 Moreover,
all branches of the armed forces have administered the lie detector in crim-
inal work at some time," and several federal agencies have used the ma-
chine to test the loyalty and integrity of both career personnel 2 and appli-
cants for employment. The Atomic Energy Commission, for example, re-
fused to consider applicants for a selected group of "sensitive positions" at
Oak Ridge until they had submitted to a lie detector test.' 3
However, the lie detector has achieved only limited respectability in the
4 See Pinter v. State, 203 Miss. 344, 34 So. 2d 723 (1948).
5 See Tyler v. United States, 193 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Commonwealth v. Hipple, 333
Pa. 33, 3 A.2d 353 (1939) ; INBAU & Rnm 76-77. John Reid once questioned 32 murder suspects
and secured confessions to 18 rapes and 264 armed robberies and burglaries, none of which had
been attributed to these suspects. Detzer, supra note 1, at 62. Reid, co-author of INBAu & Rm
and the head of an outstanding lie detector agency in Chicago, had personally obtained over
5,000 felony confessions by 1953. Id. In light of these statistics, it is not surprising that the
bulk of lie detector work today is done with the hope of securing confessions. See 6 STrN. L.
REV. 172-74 (1953). For a discussion of the admissibility of such confessions, see note 25 infra.
6 See Note, 39 CALIC. L. REv. 439, 443 (1951).
7 See Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test and the Law of Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REv. 711,
714 (1953).
8 Some insurance companies offer fidelity bonds at substantially lower rates to firms that
utilize lie detectors to eliminate potential troublemakers. See Note, 29 CORNEL L.Q. 535, 540
(1944).
9 See Wicker, supra note 7, at 713-14; N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1951, p. 1, col. 2.
10 The lie detector also has been employed in recent Congressional committee investiga-
tions. See N.Y. Times, March 9, 1957, p. 12, col. 2.
11 See MacDonald, The Lie Detector Era, Par, I, The Reporter, June 8, 1954, p. 10, at 16
(hereinafter cited as MacDonald I). See also Trovillo, Scientific Proof of Credibility, 22 TENN.
L. REv. 743 (1953).
12 For the resulting unsettling psychological effects of this practice on these persons, see
MacDonald I; MacDonald, The Lie Detector Era, Part II, The Reporter, June 22, 1954, p. 22
(hereinafter cited as MacDonald II). For a discussion of the general impact of loyalty and
security employment tests, see BROWN, LOYALTY AND SECURITY 183-200 (1958).
13 N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1951, p. 1, col. 2. For criticism of the AEC's failure to extend this
practice to plants and installations other than Oak Ridge, see Gillespie, Security Maintenance in
Industrial Enterprise, ATOMIC ENERGY IINDUSTRIAL AND LEGAL PRoBLErs (1952), who suggests
that the use of the device at Los Alamos might have trapped the Rosenberg spy ring before
atomic bomb secrets were given to Russia. The AEC, however, defended its policy decision
on the ground, inter alia, that the lie detector was not accepted as a proven instrument by
doctors, psychologists, courts, or the FBI. See N.Y. Times, supra.
legal profession. 4 Some attorneys 5 and trial judges'6 make use of the
device, and lie detector evidence has been admitted by stipulation17 in at
least one criminal case' 8 and in a number of civil cases. 9 But in the absence
of such a stipulation only a few appellate courts have sustained the admis-
sibility, in criminal 0 or civi2 Oa trials, of expert testimony based on the re-
14 For the areas where it has found acceptance, see Harman and Arther, The Utilization of
The Reid Polygraph by Attorneys and the Courts, 2 Cmu. L. REv. 12 (1955) ; Arther and Reid,
Utilizing the Lie Detector Technique to Determine the Truth in Disputed Paternity Cases,
45 J. C= . L. & CRMMINOLOGY 213 (1954).
15 In recent years over 275 Midwestern attorneys have retained John Reid & Associates
for the examination of prospective clients and witnesses. Harman and Arther, supra note 14,
at 12.
16 See MacDonald-I, at 14; note 3 supra. See also notes 19 and 20 infra. Judges who make
use of the lie detector generally do so in the hope of "encouraging" a settlement.
17 For a model stipulation agreement, see INBAu & REm 135.
18 People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948). In this case, the examiner
testified the test results indicated deception. On defendant's appeal from a conviction, his con-
tention that the examiner lacked the qualifications of an expert was rejected, apparently on
estoppel grounds.
19 See INBAu & REm 127, 132-35; Dession, Freedman, Donnelly and Redlich, Drug-
Induced Revelation and Criminal Investigation, 62 Y= L.J. 315, 327-28 (1953); Gregory,
Let's Understand the Lie Detector Test, Mfica B.J. Feb. 1951, p. 6; Note, 26 J. CanM. L. &
CRnoryoY 262 (1935). In Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951), at the
instigation of the trial court, both parties agreed to submit to lie detector tests in order to
determine the title to a dump truck and trailer. On plaintiff's appeal the admission of this evi-
dence was held not prejudicial error. The court relied principally on the fact that the trial judge
had "about concluded" that the preponderance of the evidence lay with the defendant before
the test results were available!
20 The general exclusionary rule has been applied under a variety of circumstances in re-
cent criminal cases. For example, appellate courts have refrained from characterizing as revers-
ible error trial courts' refusal to give tests to defendants, on the ground that the results would
have been inadmissible. See Commonwealth ex rel. Riccio v. Dilworth, 179 Pa. Super. 64, 115
A. 2d 865 (1955); State v. Perlin, 268 Wis. 529, 68 N.W. 2d 32 (1955) ; People v. Porter, 136
Cal.App.2d 461, 288 P.2d 561 (1955); People v. Porter, 99 Cal.App.2d 506, 222 P.2d 151
(1950). Appellate courts have also refused to permit the introduction of test results in the
guise of an accusatory statement. See People v. Aragon, 154 Cal. App. 2d 646, 316 P.2d 370
(1957); People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App.2d 124, 219 P.2d 70 (1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
888 (1951) ; People v. Welke, 342 Mich. 164, 68 N.W.2d 759 (1955). For an interesting vari-
ation see Kaminski v. State, 63 So.2d 339 (Fla. 1952) ; 6 STAN. L. REv. 172 (1953). There the
prosecution unsuccessfully attempted to rehabilitate an impeached witness with testimony that
he had truthfully answered the same questions during a lie detector test prior to the trial. But
see Tyler v. United States, 193 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1951), where the prosecution obtained ad-
mission of testimony that the examiner told defendant the test results were unfavorable by
limiting the evidence to the issue of whether a subsequent confession was voluntary. For other
criminal cases excluding testimony based on lie detector results, see McCoalcK, EVIDENC §174
(1954); INBAu & REID 127, 135-39; 3 WIGmORE, EvIDENcE § 999 (3d ed. 1940); 23 A.L.R.2d
1306 (1952) ; notes 21 and 23 infra. See also People v. Newson, 37 Cal. 2d 34, 230 P.2d 618
(1951), reversing on other grounds a conviction based in part on lie detector evidence. The only
reported unreversed criminal decision admitting lie detector test results over objection is People
v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1938). That case, however, was not appealed. And see
the later case of People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938), where the New York
Court of Appeals held such evidence inadmissible without mentioning People v. Kenny, supra.
20a There is no conclusive trend discernible in non-stipulation civil cases. See Gideon v.
Gideon, 153 Cal. App. 2d 541, 314 P.2d 1011 (1957) (appellant in divorce action was not per-
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sults of lie detector tests. Even favorable test results offered by criminal
defendants are customarily held inadmissible,21 and in a recent California
decision, People v. Carter,2 it was held reversible error to permit a witness
in a criminal trial to testify that, as a suspect in the case, he had been willing
to take a lie detector test. The Supreme Court stated that this evidence, by
implying the defendant had refused to do so, inevitably created an unwar-
ranted inference of guilt.
23
Although a number of rationales have been advanced by courts24 in
support of such rigorous applications of the exclusionary rule,25 the basic
mitted to show that the "results" of a lie detector test taken subsequent to trial "proved" that
his trial testimony had been truthful) ; Parker v. Friendt, 99 Ohio App. 329, 118 N.E.2d 216
(1954) (not error to exclude expert lie detector examiner's testimony in action on cognovit
note). See also California Ins. Co. v. Allen, 235 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1956). In that case, the trial
court admitted the results of lie detector tests for the limited purpose of impeaching the credi-
bility of the insured claimant. On appeal from a verdict for the insured, the company's conten-
tion that the tests should have been admitted for their general probative effect was rejected.
21 People v. Spigno, 156 Cal. App 2d 279, 319 P.2d 458 (1957) ; Parker v. State, 164 Neb.
614, 83 N.W.2d 347 (1957); Hayes v. State, 292 P.2d 442 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956); People v.
Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269 (1955) ; Hawkins v. State, 222 Miss. 753, 77 So. 2d 263
(1955) ; State v. Casale, 150 Me. 310, 110 A. 2d 588 (1954).
2248 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957).
23 Id. at 752, 312 P.2d at 674. But see State v. Sheppard, 100 Ohio App. 345, 128 N.E.2d 471
(1955), aff'd, 165 Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E.2d 340 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 910 (1956), where
it was held not prejudicial error for a prosecution witness to testify that he had submitted to a
lie detector test. See also McCain v. Sheridan, 160 Cal. App. 2d ........324 P.2d 923 (1958), which
upheld the dismissal of a police officer for refusing to take a lie detector test he and other
officers had requested in order to establish their innocence of misappropriating police depart-
ment funds. As a general rule, however, the courts exclude evidence of a defendant's willingness
to submit to a test. See People v. Parrella, 158 Cal. App. 2d. ....... 322 P.2d 83 (1958); Common-
wealth v. Saunders, 386 Pa. 149, 125 A.2d 442 (1956).
24 Some decisions have indicated that lie detector evidence offered by a defendant is in-
admissible on "self-serving" grounds. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Saunders, 386 Pa. 149, 157,
125 A.2d 442, 445-46 (1956) ; People v. Porter, 136 Cal. App. 2d 461, 470, 288 P.2d 561, 567
(1955). Appellate courts have remained singularly unimpressed by the self-incrimination factor.
See Hardman, Lie Detectors, Extrajudicial Investigations and the Courts, 48 W. VA. L. Rlv. 37,
38-40 (1941). But see Silving, Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69 HA.av. L. Rxv.
683, 686 (1956), for a declaration that this represents perhaps the most forceful argument yet
advanced to curtail scientific testing.
For discussion of these and other theories used by courts to exclude lie detector evidence,
see Dession, Freedman, Donnelly and Redlich, Drug-Induced Revelation and Criminal Inves-
tigation, 62 YALE L.J. 315, 323-28 (1953) ; 23 A.L.R.2d 1306, 1309 (1952) ; 39 CALir. L. Rv.
439, 441 (1951). It is an interesting commentary on the judicial process that, while early cases
were careful to articulate the reasons for refusing to admit this evidence, more recent decisions
tend to cite the established rule as if it were an eternal verity. Compare State v. Bohner,
210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933), with Stockwell v. State, 301 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Crim. App.
1957); People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938), with Hawkins v. State, 222 Miss.
753, 77 So. 2d 263 (1955).
25 The general rule does not necessarily result in the exclusion of confessions induced by the
lie detector. See note 5 supra. Where the suspect either agrees to or does not oppose the test,
and where there are no threats or other improper inducements involved, these confessions gen-
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justification is that lie detector tests have not yet obtained sufficient scien-
tific acceptance as a significantly reliable 6 means of ascertaining truth and
deception.
2 7
The Theory of the Lie Detector
The effectiveness of the lie detector necessarily is dependent upon the
validity of the underlying hypothesis that the psychological stress which
erally are held admissible. See Tyler v. United States, 193 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Despres,
Legal Aspects of Drug-Induced Statements, 14 U. Cm. L. Rav. 601, 611-12 (1946). See also
S6DERM A & O'Coauunz MODMNr CRnwAL INVESTIGATION 33 (1952). For excellent general
discussions of such confession cases, see Dession, Freedman, Donnelly and Redlich, supra note 24
at 333-38; Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test and the Law of Evidence, 22 TamE. L. REv.
711, 715-25 (1953). For a discussion of the United States Supreme Court's position in the con-
fession field, see 8 STAN. L. REv. 451 (1956). See also Webb v. State, 291 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1956), holding the use of the lie detector a constitutional method of interrogation, and one
that does not render a confession involuntary. On this latter point, see also Gasway v. State,
157 Tex. Crim. 647, 248 S.W.2d 942 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952) ; Leeks v. State,
95 Okla. Crim. 326, 245 P.2d 764 (1952).
Even though inadmissible, confessions often lead to other evidence helpful to law enforce-
ment agencies. See McLaughlin, The Lie Detector as an Aid in Arson and Criminal Investiga-
tion, 43 J. CRmm. L. & CRnUMOGoaY 690 (1953). See also S6DERNIAN & O'CONNELL, op. Cit. supra
at 33. Any evidence obtained thereby ordinarily is held admissible. See Conrad, Psychiatric Lie
Detection, 21 F.R.D. 199, 201-02 (1958) ; Dession, Freedman, Donnelly and Redlich, supra at
335. See also Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REv. 411
(1954).
28 As used in this context, reliability is usually defined as the extent to which a test meas-
ures what it purports to measure. See Lanier, Prediction of the Reliability of Mental Tests and
Tests of Special Abilities, 10 J. or ExpraasENTA PsYcH. 69, 110 (1927). See also 10 Eucyc.
Soc. Scr. 327.
2 This rationale has been adopted in California. See People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737,
751-52, 312 P.2d 665, 674 (1957) ; People v. Porter, 136 Cal. App. 2d 461, 470, 288 P.2d 561,
567 (1955); People v. Porter, 99 Cal. App. 2d 506, 510, 22 P.2d 151, 154 (1950); People v.
Wochnick, 98 Cal.App. 2d 124, 128, 219 P.2d 70, 72 (1950).
The leading case is Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), where the court
excluded testimony to the effect that a lie detector test indicated Frye was innocent. Although
convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, Frye was subsequently exonerated
when another person confessed to the crime. See FOURTENTH AmNuAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CouNcm or THE STATE or NEw Yoax 265 (1948). The expert involved in the Frye case was
Professor Marston, a pioneer lie detector experimenter at Harvard. See LARSON & ADLER, A
STUDY or DECEPTION TN THE PM n TNTIARY 553, 554 (1925). For other cases, see note 20 supra,
and references cited therein.
For other authority to the same effect, see INBAu & Ram 130: "It must be reported that at
the present time the technique is not an 'accepted' one among the scientists whose approval is a
pre-requisite to judicial recognition." But see McCoRmIcK, EVIDENCE § 174 (1954) for a con-
tention that the lie detector has achieved scientific acceptance sufficient to qualify it under
"normal" standards of admissibility. See also Cureton, A Consensus as to the Validity of Poly-
graph Procedures, 22 Tam. L. R .728 (1953).
Advocates of admissibility sometimes seek to link lie detectors with the better established
scientific fact-finding tools, such as ballistics and fingerprints, which are regularly held admis-
sible, and those granted more limited admissibility, such as the X-ray and blood types. For a
point-by-point exposition of their distinguishing features vis-a-vis the lie detector, see Forkosch
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results from telling a lie concomitantly causes physiological reactions which
can be mechanically recorded. A concise summary of this hypothesis was
set forth in Frye v. United States:
28
It is asserted that blood pressure is influenced by change in the emotions
of the witness, and that the systolic blood pressure rises are brought about
by nervous impulses sent to the sympathetic branch of the autonomic nerv-
ous system. Scientific experiments, it is claimed, have demonstrated that
fear, rage, and pain always produce a rise of systolic blood pressure, and
that conscious deception or falsehood, concealment of facts, or guilt of
crime, accompanied by fear of detection when the person is under examin-
ation, raises the systolic blood pressure in a curve, which corresponds ex-
actly to the struggle going on in the subject's mind, between fear and at-
tempted control of that fear, as the examination touches the vital points
in respect of which he is attempting to deceive the examiner.
In other words, the theory seems to be that truth is spontaneous, and
comes without conscious effort, while the utterance of a falsehood requires
a conscious effort, which is reflected in the blood pressure. The rise thus
produced is easily detected and distinguished from the rise produced by
mere fear of the examination itself. In the former instance, the pressure
rises higher than in the latter, and is more pronounced as the examination
proceeds, while in the latter case, if the subject is telling the truth, the pres-
sure registers highest at the beginning of the examination, and gradually
diminishes as the examination proceeds.
28 a
A natural corollary of this hypothesis is that the examiner can detect
and disregard any recordations not caused by deception responses.
History and Description of the Lie Detector
The fact that useful inferences might be drawn from certain physiologi-
cal phenomena was well known to the ancient world.2" The early Chinese,
for example, forced suspects to chew rice powder. If it remained dry, they
were deemed guilty.8"
222-24; Koffler, The Lie Detector-A Critical Appraisal of the Technique as a Potential Under-
mining Factor in the Judicial Process, 3 N.Y. LAW FORUM 123 (1957). See also HATCHER, JURY
& WELLER, FzaARms INvSTIGATiON IDENTIFICATION AND EVIDENCE (1957); BURRARD, TH
IDENTIFICATION or FnUARms AND FoRENsic BALLISTICS (rev. ed. 1951); WEHDE & BrL,
FINGERPRINTS CAN BE FORGED (1924) ; Ross, The Value of Blood Tests as Evidence in Paternity
Cases, 71 HARV. L. Rav. 466 (1958).
28 2 9 3 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
28a Id. at 1014. For reproductions of lie detector recordations, see INBAU & RED, passim ;
Larson, Cardio-Pneumo-Psychogram in Deception, 6 J. oF EXPERIMENTAL PsYcH. 420 (1923).
The most reliable criteria apparently are obtainable from a continuing and simultaneous re-
cording of relative changes in blood pressure, pulse and respiration.
29 The Greek physician Erasistratus utilized such phenomena as early as 250 B.C. See
MULBAR, INTERROGATION 13 (1951) (hereinafter cited as MULBAR).
30 Langley, The Polygraph Lie Detector: Its Physiological Basis, Reliability and Admis-
sibility, 16 ALA. LAwYER 209, 210 (1955). For other Oriental methods of determining guilt or
innocence, see SNYDER, HOMIciDE INVESTIGATION 83-84 (1950).
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But the systematic use of physiological reactions in "scientific" lie
detection has a relatively brief history. The first person to use an instru-
ment for this purpose was Cesare Lombroso, an Italian physiologist. In
1895 he claimed success in establishing the guilt or innocence of suspects
by taking their blood pressures while being questioned.31 Under Lombroso's
method, the' ispect was ordered to grasp a rod with his fist, which was then
sealed in a water-filled tank by a rubber membrane. The variations of the
suspect's heart pulsations, as they appeared in his fist, rhythmically raised
and lowered the water level in a glass bulb above the tank. A tube leading
off from this glass bulb transposed the water level variations into air column.
pressure which operated the recording mechanism.
In 1914, V. Benussi reported on the results of his study of respiration
and its relationship to deception. By strapping an elastic rubber tube
around the chest of a suspect, with one end sealed and the other leading
into a hose connected to a recording mechanism, Benussi was able to reflect
the suspect's every "inspiration and expiration" in graphic form.-"
The most significant event in the historical development of the lie de-
tector was the invention of the ink "polygraph" by Dr. James MacKenzie,
a famous heart specialist.3  Although originally intended solely for medical
purposes, it was basically the same instrument as the blood pressure, pulse
and respiration recorders used today for lie detection purposes.
The MacKenzie polygraph was first used in practical lie detection in
192 1,3 when a young medical student successfully discovered a dormitory
thief at the University of California. 35 During the next twenty years,36 Mac-
Kenzie's bulky separate testing units gradually were superseded, by port-
able units, now exemplified by the compact Keeler37 polygraph.
The most prevalent type of detector in use today, the Keeler polygraph
resembles a complicated radio transmitter sprouting cables and electronic
gadgets. These gadgets are electrically connected to several stylus pens
which record (on rolls of white paper tape) the fluctuations of the physio-
81 See MLBAR 61, 96; MacDonald I, at 10.
32 Benussi, die AtmungsymPtome der Litge, 31 AncmE PUR DER GEsAmTE PsYcroLoram
244 (1914).
S3 An article by Dr. Mackenzie in the BRmsu MEDICAL JOURNAL in 1908, describing the
device, is reprinted in INBAu & REin 233-35. See also 3 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 999 (3d ed. 1940).
84 The first court room use of lie detector evidence took place in Los Angeles in 1913. Ibid.
35 See MULBAR 98-99. See also SBDERmA & O'CoNNELL , MODERN CaRumA INVESTIGATioN
32 (1952).
6 For a more detailed history of this period, see Levitt, Scientific Bvaluation of the
"Lie Detector," 40 IowA L. REv. 440 (1955).
ST Leonarde Keeler was without doubt one of the foremost authorities on the lie detector.
Keeler's early work with the machine was at Stanford University. See SNYDER, HoMICIDE IN-
vEsTGATio 85 (1950). He also used the famous Northwestern Univerity Crime Laboratory
before it was purchased by the City of Chicago in 1938. See MVxnBA 133. A number of Keeler's
legendary exploits with the lie detector are reported in MacDonald .
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logical functions being measured, and may include:3" A wire connected with
a board platform for the feet, and another connected with an armrest, to
disclose involuntary tightening of arm or leg muscles; an inflatable rubber
cuff like the familiar device used by physicians to measure blood pressure,
which is wrapped around the upper arm to measure the alternating disten-
tion and contraction of the tissue of the arm due to changes of blood pres-
sure and volume; a corrugated rubber tube that expands and contracts as
one breathes, which is fastened around the chest to record pressure changes
caused by irregularities in breathing.
An attachment less frequently used is an instrument for measuring the
resistance of the skin to electrical current. Electrodes, approximately one by
two inches and usually of silver, are strapped in the palm or on the back of
the hand by rubber bands. The subject's emotional responses induce corre-
sponding variations in the skin surface electrical phenomena,39 which are
transferred through the electrodes to a magnetic recording needle. For a
variety of reasons,4" this device is regarded as less satisfactory than the con-
ventional blood pressure, respiration, and muscular attachments.
4
0a
38 For others, see Trovillo, Scientific Proof of Credibility, 22 TENN. L. REv. 743, 748-49
(1953). See also Detzer, Don't Underestimate the Lie Detector, The Reader's Digest, Nov.,
1953, p. 49; Burt, Examination of Offenders, 2 HANDBOOK OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 557 (1950).
89 The trade name for this electrodermal response is "G.S.R." ("Galvanic Skin Reflex").
See INBAU & REID 99. See also Forkosch 209-11. Some examiners also rely on the measurement
of tremors and motor reactions to show deception. See id. at 206.
Beginning about 1907, many experiments called attention to the apparent relation between
electrical skin changes and the emotions. But it was not until 1930 that instruments designed
to record electrodermal variations and deception correlations were used for lie detection pur-
poses. MULBAR 49. The psychogalvanometer, invented by Father Summers of Fordham Univer-
sity, was approved by the great C. G. Jung, who concluded it was possible to detect attempts
at lying or evasion with its help. MacDonald I, at 11-12.
40 See Harman and Arther, The Utilization of the Reid Polygraph by Attorneys and the
Courts, 2 CRm. L. REv. 12, 21 (1955) ("unreliable and not valid"); MacDonald I at 13. It is
argued that the psychogalvanometer (see note 39 supra) measures only the sensory concomitants
and therefore alcohol and narcotics tend to impair the efficacy and reliability of results by
reducing physiological reactions. See Forkosch 217. The machine is also criticized on the ground
that it measures only the subject's alertness and attention, which are claimed to be inconsequen-
tial and subordinate issues in criminal work. See INBAU & REID 102-06.
40a There are still advocates of the G.S.R. in criminal work, however. See MacNitt, In
Defense of the Electrodermal Response and Cardiac Amplitude as Measures of Deception,
33 J. Cpam. L. & CaImIooGY 266 (1942) ; Summers, Science Can Get the Confession, 8 Foa-
uAm L. R . 334 (1939). And some writers feel that it offers future research possibilities. See
INBAU & REID 118-21; LEE, THE INSTRUMENTAL DETECTION OF DECEPTION (1953). It is gen-
erally agreed, moreover, that a subject's "G.S.R." offers a reasonably reliable deception criterion
as a laboratory instrument for experiments. See MULBAR 49, 99-100. But a comparable degree
of accuracy is unobtainable in actual criminal work. By the nature of things there could be little
correlation between the emotional stresses criminal suspects are likely to have and those of the
average laboratory volunteer, often a college student, if for no other reason than the strikingly
different sanctions applied to one who performs poorly.
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Examination Techniques
The standard lie detector examination takes from 45 minutes to an
hour and consists of oral responses to oral questions. The questions, of
course, must be unambiguous, unequivocal, and completely understandable
by the subject.4 All questions and answers (always "yes" or "no"42), as
well as the lapses of time between them, are recorded by the examiner. For
best results, the test should be given in a room free from noise, interrup-
tions, and other annoying outside influences. This requirement effectively
eliminates courtroom examinations. 3
The examiner usually conducts a "trial run" or pre-test to establish a
responsive norm for the subject. Questions designed to evoke "normal"
responses are asked in order to develop "normal" base lines on the graphs,
which the examiner later uses to interpret the polygraphic recordation of
the subject's reactions to more pertinent questions.44 In addition, the pre-
test procedure serves to acquaint the subject with the polygraph examina-
tion technique, and is intended to both decrease the likelihood that an inno-
cent subject will be unduly nervous during the regular examination and
instill in a guilty subject a fear of the polygraph so that any subsequent
falsehoods will result in a more pronounced complex of emotional responses.
A variety of questioning techniques have been developed for use during
the regular examination. In the "peak-of-tension" test, the suspect is shown
a list of several questions, only one of which deals with the crime. The sus-
pect is then ordered to answer "no" to all the questions on the theory that a
"peak" will show on the graph tracings if "no" is an incorrect answer to
the key question. 5 Under another method, inconsequential or irrelevant
41 Throughout this discussion, the semantical problems of definition and ambiguity have
been subsumed. For detailed explanations of these problems, see HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN
AcTroN (1939); CHASE, THE TYA= or WoRDs (1938); KoayBsEr, ScraENcA S jNm
(1933).
42 If the subject attempts to offer any explantions he is instructed to wait until the con-
clusion of the test.
43 Courts probably would not permit such an innovation even if it were technically feasible.
See State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43 (1945), where the defendant made a motion at
the beginning of trial that all witnesses be required to give testimony while strapped to a lie
detector. The motion was denied, inter alia, because "the day has not come when all the wit-
nesses in a case can be subjected to such inquisitorial and deceptive tests . . ." (Id. at 193,
188 S.W.2d at 51.)
4 4 For an interesting discussion on the selection of norm questions, see MurBAR 113. See
also Forkosch 213-14. Apparently an examiner can never be sure when a seemingly innocent
question, such as "Do you drive a car?", will uncover a subject's irrelevant suppressed fear
(here perhaps of the discovery of a hit-and-run accident not at issue in the examination) which
will result in a false emotional norm.
45For examples of peak-of-tension recordings, see IwaAu & REm 53-63, 38-42. For a dis-
cussion of how to eliminate accidental responses in such tests, see SNYDER, HOxICIDE INvwsT-
oAmoN 90 (1950). Variations of the peak-of-tension test include having the subject mentally
select a number from one to ten or one of several cards with numbers on them.
These two variations are used primarily in the trial run to impress a subject with the "fact"
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questions are interspersed with those related to the suspected crime.
Perhaps the most popular questioning device is the "control question"
test. Regular relevant-irrelevant questioning is utilized, with the addition
of a "control" question in the general area of the particular crime. A sus-
pected thief, for example, might be asked, "Did you ever steal anything in
your life?" 4 It is assumed that a guilty subject will answer such a question
with a lie.47
Almost any variation from the established linear norm which occurs
while a subject is answering a relevant or control question is interpreted
as a deception response. There are also several significant correlations of re-
sponses to control and relevant questions. If there is no appreciable differ-
ence in responses, or if the control question response is greater than the
response to relevant questions, the subject is deemed to be telling the truth;
if there is a specific response to the relevant questions, but none to the
control question, deception by the subject is assumed.48 And assuming a
deviation from the subject's norm, the response which is considered the
most dependable indication of deception is a simultaneous occurrence of a
suppression in respiration and an increase in blood pressure. But the prac-
tice of automatically classifying rises in blood pressure as deception re-
sponses has been vigorously denounced by some professional examiners
as a "gross error.49
After the regular examination is completed several reruns are custom-
arily required, since an examiner seldom can detect deception in only one
or two "runs."" ° While the same questions are asked during a second ex-
that by use of the polygraph it is possible to tell when he is lying. Id. at 87-88. They also are
used to expose suspects who may try to "beat" the lie detector. While it may seem unlikely that
such trial run tests would uncover a subject in the mood to beat the machine, some suspects
do not act rationally in this regard. See McCain v. Sheridan, 160 Cal. App. 2d ....... 324 P.2d 923
(1958).
46 For examples of other "control" questions, see Harman and Reid, The Selection and
Phrasing of Lie-Detector Test Control Questions, 46 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 578 (1955).
47 It is alleged that innocent subjects consistently answer "yes" to such questions. See
Arther, A Further Interpretation of Innocent Blood-Pressure Rises in Polygraph Testing, 47 J.
Cams. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 260 (1956) ; Arther, Blood Pressure Rises on Relevant Questions in Lie
Detection-Sometimes An Indication of Innocence Not Guilt, 46 J. CRar. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
112 (1955). For the related responses of "guilty" subjects to the so-called "guilt complex" and
"fictitious crime" questions, see INBAU & R.Em 14, 44-47.
48 See INBAU & REm 38-46; Arther, A Further Interpretation of Innocent Blood-Pressure
Rises in Polygraph Testing, 47 J. Cmr. L. & CRIMINOLoGY 260, 260-62 (1956). See also
Forkosch 214.
49 See Arther, Blood Pressure Rises on Relevant Questions in Lie Detection-Sometimes
an Indication of Innocence Not Guilt, 46 J. CRim. L. & CRnOLOGY 112 (1955).
50 Four or more runs are usually required. MULBAR 128. Just as in the case of pre-testing,
reruns should heighten a guilty subject's apprehension and fear of exposure. See Arther, supra
note 48, at 264. Repeated testings, however, may have an unfortunate tendency to reduce the
responses of a guilty subject as he becomes aware that he is beating the machine. See IrBAu
& REID 48.
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amination, in any subsequent tests their context may be adjusted to fit the
circumstances and the previous responses of the subject. Reruns are con-
ducted by the examiner until the subject's responses consistently indicate
either truth or deception.
Apparent Defects in the Theory
The Crucial Role of the Examiner
The polygraph, despite its impressive scientific appearance, is not an
infallible "lie detector." In fact, that name is a complete misnomer. The
person who operates the machine is the lie detector by reason of his inter-
pretations. J. Edgar Hoover has estimated that 90% of the polygraph's use-
fulness depends on careful evaluation of the results by experienced exam-
iners.51
This situation arises from the fact that the polygraph records only the
fluctuations of selected physiological functions. For a diagnosis of truth or
deception, the examiner must weigh these recordations with a plethora of
other factors," all of varying relative importance with each subject. There-
fore, while it may be theoretically possible for an examiner to detect and
disregard any "results" not caused by deception responses, the reliability
and accuracy of the polygraph examination process is dependent upon the
basic qualifications and general diagnostic competence of the examiner.
To be forced to rely on an individual examiner's level of proficiency to
validate the "lie detector" hypothesis is basically undesirable because of
the disadvantages inherent in the use of the human element, which include
fatigue, illness and nervousness, and the ubiquitous factors of conscious
and unconscious bias. 3 But such dependence is particularly unfortunate
at the present time because there are very few examiners who are both ex-
perienced and responsible. Although there are 300-400 persons who regu-
larly give polygraph tests and examinations, leading professionals have
admitted that not more than 10% are truly competent.5" These professionals
51 See MacDonald II at 22. See also Keeler, Debunking The "Lie Detector," 25 J. CnMs. L.
& Cm enroLoGY 153 (1934). The FBI, which has never regarded the lie detector as anything but
an unproved experimental device, uses it only if desired by a suspect. Even then a request is
not always granted. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1951, p. 1, col.2. See also FnRAr & Fwnr, NoT
GuxT 161 (1957).
52 The polygraph test results must be considered in relation to the quantity of the subject's
blood, the quickness of his heart, the rate of his breathing, the reactions of his sweat-glands,
his fear or other mental condition at the time of the test, his education, the presence of other
people, etc. See Forkosch 210-11; Koessler, Fallibility of Testimony and Jutdicidal Accident Risk,
4 CR . L. Rav. 56, 64-65 (1957).
53 See West, A Psychological Theory of Law, in INTREaPErATioNS or MODERN LEAL PH -
Losoprs 767, 782 (Sayre ed. 1947) ; Koessler, supra note 52. See also IwBAu & Rm 110; LE.E,
Txn INSTRumENTAL DETEToN or DECEOT (1953) ; N.Y. Times, supra note 51.
54 See MacDonald I, at 14. See also Gardner, Book Review, 10 STAN. L. Rzv. 189, 195
(1957).
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also acknowledge that it is relatively simple for incompetent or dishonest
"experts" to render inaccurate or perjured testimony for the party by whom
they are employed.55 Nevertheless, this shortage of qualified examiners
should not cause an automatic rejection of the polygraph. An adequate num-
ber undoubtedly could be recruited and trained if that were the only sig-
nificant obstacle blocking judicial approval.
The Deceptive Certainty of Polygraph Recordations
A number of apparent defects in the theory of the polygraph can be
advanced to justify the courts' refusal to admit into evidence even an "ex-
pert's" interpretation of the results of a polygraph examination.
First, certain physiological phenomena affect the validity of the initial
premise that the polygraph will reliably reflect a subject's attempts to de-
ceive by recording the attendant physiological reactions:
57
Emotional unresponsiveness. An examiner cannot detect deception if
the subject is unresponsive in character or nature,5 or if the subject has no
fear of detection because of a fatalistic attitude, rationalization of his be-
havior, "circumscribed amnesia, or a condition of shock or exhaus-
tion.6' In addition, the polygraph cannot be used successfully on pathologi-
55 See INBAU & REm 128.
56 Leading examiners already have made a start in this direction by forming the American
Academy of Polygraph Examiners. The purposes and aims of this Academy are well presented
in the Note, An Academy of Polygraph ("Lie Detector") Examiners, 45 J. CamI. L. & CRIKI-
xOLOGY 359 (1954). While medical training is not considered a requisite, it has been suggested
that an examiner "should have a good background of training in psychology and physiology
... together with long experience with straight investigative work, a clear understanding of
how to approach each case on a scientific basis, and a deep sense of honesty and ethics," as well
as "personal traits of patience, resourcefulness, tact, good judgment, persistence . .. keenness
S..-, capability [and] competence." MuLBAR 104-05. For equally unrealistic (though admirable)
standards, see INBAU & REm 114-16. For a survey of other recommended qualifications for
examiners see SNYDER, HomIcimE INVESTIGATION ch. 6 (1950).
57 "Even as regards the experienced, competent examiner, the chief source of error with
the lie detector technique is in its failure to detect deception." INBAU & REm 112. See also
Harman and Arther, The Utilization of the Reid Polygraph by Attorneys and the Courts,
2 Casa. L. REV. 12, 27 (1955): "[The polygraph] is far from the automatic device some per-
sons think it to be."
58 This is regarded as the machine's principal disadvantage. INBAU & REm 71. See also
Forkosch 210-11; Burack, A Critical Analysis of the Theory, Method, and Limitations of the
"Lie Detector," 46 J. Cami. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 414, 424-25 (1955).
59 In a number of cases, prior confession to a priest has materially facilitated such rational-
ization. INBAU & REm 82, 83. Some subjects have succeeded in suppressing all feelings of guilt
even where the crime was rape or murder. See id. at 13.
60 Repression of crime into the unconscious leaves the subject with complete forgetfulness
or amnesia of the events of the crime, thereby preventing deception responses. See Floch, Limi-
tations of the Lie Detector, 40 J. Cami. L. & CRImiNOLOGY 651, 653 (1950).
61 The "third degree" and other intensive methods of interrogation eliminate deception
responses by relieving a suspect's mental conflict. Various drugs and sedatives are also capable
of materially reducing a suspect's responsiveness. Nevertheless, it is assumed that drugs so affect
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cal liars, 2 children,63 the mentally dull,6" or other subjects who are unable
to distinguish between truth and falsehood.
Ability to "beat" the machine. Misleading graph tracings also may be
created by controlled breathing, muscle pressure,61 and self-inflicted pain.
But because of the fact that one out of five guilty subjects apparently
attempts to distort polygraph recordations by these or similar stratagems,
67
experienced examiners have concluded that the more a subject tries to "beat
the machine," the easier it is to detect his guilt.
Some subjects, however, have the ability to unobtrusively eliminate the
crux of the lie detector theory by being able to control their emotional re-
sponses with certain mental attitudes or "sets." Jerry Thompson, perpetra-
tor of the infamous Mildred Hallmark rape-murder, was an example of a
subject able to beat the machine in this manner. When interviewed in his
death cell (the polygraph examiner had obtained his confession despite the
indefinite test results), Thompson stated that whenever he was asked
whether he had killed "Mildred," he would concentrate upon and mentally
reenact various abnormal sexual experiences with another girl of the same
the suspect's physical appearance and behavior that the examiner should be able to detect their
use. See INDiaU & REm 75. Compare Lindsley, Emotions, HANDBOOK OF EXPERMNTAL PsY-
CEXOLOGY 473 (1951). But even simple aspirin will change the heart's normal actions and thereby
affect the blood pressure recordations. MacDonald I at 28. To insure the absence of these or
similar substances, therefore, appropriate blood and urine tests should be administered.
62Pathological liars present a particularly difficult problem for examiners. Even psychia-
trists and psychologists often are unable to discover this condition without prolonged inter-
views, because afflicted persons are remarkably consistent in their lies. See Marston, Reaction
Time Symptoms of Deception, 3 J. or EXPERImNTAL PsYcH. 72 (1920).
63The cut-off age is usually 13, although this seems somewhat arbitrary. See INBAu &
R3m 77.
64 Imbediles and idiots can be discovered through mental tests. See SmnuasAxa & Wnzmlars,
] gTAL DEFCimNCy PRAcTiCE 84-127 (1932). Morons, while more difficult to detect because
of their verbal fluency, can be ascertained either by testing or through their general unrespon-
siveness to questions. See PINTER, INTELLIGENCE TESTING 322 (1931).
65 See MacDonald I at 12; MacDonald II at 28. Even a momentary holding of the breath
has sensational results on the graph. Examiners claim they can detect this stratagem either by
visual observation of the subject or by the resulting abnormal graph tracing. See INBAU &
REm 83-85.
66 M uscular pressures exerted either in the arms or legs can produce all the typical blood
pressure responses of deception, including the two blood pressure tracings which have always
been confusing even to skilled examiners-a tracing climbing steadily to the top of the chart,
and a tracing declining steadily to the bottom. See INBAu & REin 92-93. In an effort to solve
this problem, INBAu & REm have developed a device specifically designed to detect these mus-
cular pressures. Id., at 94-97. Now a standard attachment on all Keeler-Reid polygraphs, this
invention is described in the text, p. 54, supra.
67 See INBAu & REID 108-09. This statistic was one result of a five-year study. For further
discussion of this study, see note 78 infra. Innocent subjects, of course, presumably have noth-
ing to gain by such avoidance techniques.
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name. By doing this he was able to temporarily dismiss from his mind the
rape and murder of Mildred Hallmark. 8
Secondly, even if a subject is emotionally responsive and otherwise un-
able to beat the machine, the following factors significantly reduce the re-
liability of the inference that particular linear fluctuations represent
deception responses:69
Physiological abnormalities. In order to obtain meaningful results, the
subject must be in reasonably good physical condition at the time of the
test. Any person with heart disease, excessively high or low blood pressure,
or a respiratory disorder will react in an abnormal manner. Temporary
conditions such as drunkenness, colds, coughing spells, hiccups and allergies
also tend to make a subject unfit for testing.
Mental abnormalities. Any emotional instability caused by a neurotic,
psychotic or psychopathic condition" makes it practically impossible for
the examiner to arrive at a reliable diagnosis.
71
Nervousness or extreme emotional tension. Surveys of polygraph re-
cordations indicate that truthful subjects may react in an abnormal manner
because of anger, apprehension, confusion, fear, misunderstanding, nerv-
ous tension or general emotional stress. Anger often arises in persons un-
justly accused or suspected, and other emotional stress, such as apprehen-
sion or fear, may be caused by a belief that the test will be painful or in-
accurate. Ironically, nervous tension can be caused by an anxiety to co-
operate to obtain "good" test results. A patient's blood pressure, when
68 See INBAU & Rlm 79-80. See also MacDonald II at 28. INBAU & REm emphasize that
the Thompson case occurred before the full development of "control" questioning. But even
they cite an instance where a suspect successfully used a similar method to "beat" a polygraph
test based on control questions. An embezzler thought about previous sex affairs when asked a
control question, and about the embezzlement when asked an irrelevant question. INBAu &
REiD 9.
69 The subject's consciousness of lying and fear of detection are commonly thought to be
the factors principally responsible for the physiological changes measured by the polygraph.
See note 28 supra and accompanying text. However, a recent poll of a large number of psy-
chologists revealed that only 36% believed that these factors were the main cause of reactions
on the polygraph. See MacDonald I at 13.
70 For more technical delineations of these categories, see HENDERSON & GmLESPiE, A T X
BooR or PsYCmIATRY (6th ed. 1947). For a description of the more common psychological de-
viations which might interfere with an examination, see Floch, supra note 60.
71 The great majority of such illnesses show little or no detectable outward change in de-
meanor or social attitude. HENDERSON & GiLiEspim, op. cit. supra note 70, at 101. See also
INBAU & Rem 78-79. The psychopathic William Heirens, for example, was able to beat the
lie detector when questioned about the Suzanne Degnan killing and dismemberment. Id., at 48.
He eventually confessed under narcoanalysis, however. For later developments in the Heirens
case, see People v. Heirens, 4 Ill.2d 131, 122 N.E.2d 231 (1954).
72 See Inbau, Lie Detector Test Limitations, 2 J. FORENSIC Sci. 255 (1957) ; Levitt, Scien-
tific Evaluation of the "Lie Detector," 40 IowA L. Rzv. 440, 451-56 (1955).
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tested by his personal physician, may be abnormally high for the same
reason.
73
Proponents of the device, however, claim that these factors average out
or are reduced as the test progresses,7 4 and can be compensated for or even
eliminated by an understanding examiner. 5 But the reactions of a subject
who is worried about personal problems or unrelated offenses," or who has
undergone the "third degree" or other intensive interrogation likely to
create psychological nervous blocks, are completely unreliable.
77
The Misleading Nature of Available Statistics
Despite the apparent defects in the polygraph hypothesis, virtually all
professional examiners assume that the polygraph reliably reflects the
physiological by-products of a subject's significant emotional responses
while being questioned. These examiners also believe that such recorda-
tions, when combined with other criteria (including simple observation),
afford a valid basis for determining whether or not a subject answers truth-
fully. They assert that the "results" obtained by this diagnostic process are
up to 95% accurate.78
However, these percentages invariably are predicated upon tests con-
ducted by experienced examiners under the most favorable conditions. Un-
73 For an enumeration and discussion of other causes of nervous tension in innocent sub-
jects, see INBA & Ram 66.
7 4 See Arther, Further Interpretations of Innocent Blood Pressure Rises in Polygraph Test-
ing, 47 J. CraM. L. & CRmnoLoGY 260, 264 (1956). The review practice is usually cited in
support of this rationale. See text supra p. 56. But repeated testings may have an unfortunate
tendency to increase an innocent subject's natural fear and nervousness because of mounting
apprehension of being falsely accused. See InBAu & REm 48.
75See Arther, supra note 74; Arther, Blood Pressure Rises on Relevant Questions in Lie
Detection-Sometimes an Indication of Innocence Not Guilt, 46 J. Cn. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 112
(1955) ; INBAu & Rim 66, 68-69. But other writers claim there is no way to distinguish these
emotions from the so-called deception responses. See Levitt, Scientific Evaluation of the "Lie
Detector," 40 IowA L. REv. 440 (1955); Burack, A Critical Analysis of the Theory, Method,
and Limitations of the "Lie Detector," 46 J. Cans. L. & CPnssuor.oGy 414, 415 (1955). See also
Lindsley, Emotions, HANDBOOX or EXrEREMENTAL PSYCHOLoGy (1951).
76 In one instance, an innocent suspect produced deception responses on the polygraph
because he feared his common-law marriage would be discovered. MuLBAR 111-12. See also
note 44 supra. The technique of "control questioning" is designed to eliminate these factors.
See note 46 supra and accompanying text. See also note 74 supra.
7 7 Additional aspects of polygraph examinations which detract from a test's reliability in-
dude errors of definition, ambiguously expressed instructions, and the whole area of semantics.
See HamLTON, Tim ART OF INTERROGATION 78 (1929) ; note 41 supra.
78 This was the reputed "result" of a five year study involving 4,280 criminal suspects. The
examiners were unable to arrive at a definite opinion in 4% of the cases, and there were admitted
mistakes in 1% of the cases. INBAu & Ram 111-12. See also SNYDER, HowIcmE INvESTATmON
93-94 (1950). A subsequent study of 8,450 subjects resulted in a similar percentage breakdown.
See Harman and Arther, The Utilization of the Reid Polygraph by Attorneys and the Courts,
2 CRan. L. Rv. 12, 26 (1955).
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der more normal conditions, or when the examiner is lacking in adequate
training, general competence or complete honesty, far less accuracy should
preval. 9 Perhaps with these factors in mind, a number of authorities have
estimated that the percentage of error in polygraph test "results" may be as
high as 2 5 %.o
This conflict and disagreement among the examiners and authorities,
which has resulted in part from a dearth of sufficient clinical data, seems
to preclude any final statistical evaluation of the reliability and accuracy of
examination "results" at this time,"' and represents still another reason for
the exclusion of polygraph evidence.
Conclusion
Although the "lie detector" admittedly is of great value to law enforce-
ment agencies as an adjunctive investigatory technique, it has demonstrated
an unfortunate capacity to record the physiological reactions of truthful
subjects as deception responses, and an anomalous inability to mirror the
falsehoods of unresponsive subjects or those knowledgeable of the various
ways to beat the machine.
These defects are compelling grounds for the rejection of polygraph
evidence in criminal trials, whether admission is sought by stipulation or
over objection. Furthermore, courts should continue to exclude evidence
concerning a criminal suspect's willingness to submit to a polygraph exam-
ination, since a suspect may refuse to take the test, not because he fears
that it will reveal consciousness of guilt, but because it may record as a
lie what is in fact the truth. A guilty suspect, on the other hand, may be
willing to hazard the test in the hope that it will erroneously record in-
nocence.
Whether or not polygraph evidence is admitted in civil trials may be of
less social import because of the significantly dissimilar sanctions that are
79 For more detailed criticism of these statistics, see Levitt, supra note 75 at 450; Burack,
supra note 75 at 421-22.
80 See People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 371, 72 N.W.2d 269, 282 (1955) ; Trovillo, Scientific
Proof of Credibility, 22 TENN. L. Rav. 743, 758-59 (1953); Langley, The Polygraph Lie De-
tector: Its Physiological Basis, Reliability and Admissibility, 16 AL.A. LAWVYR 209, 223 (1955).
See also Baesen, Chung, and Yang, A Lie Detector Experiment, 39 J. CRMI:. L. & CRmIneoLoGY
532 (1948) ; Inbau, The Lie Detector, 26 B.U.L. REv. 264 (1946) ; Marston, Psychological Pos-
sibilities in the Deception Tests, 11 J. Cans. L. & CRIM NOLOGY 551 (1921).
8 1 For an indication that this confused state of affairs probably will continue, see WESTA-
WAY, ScrENTIC METHOD 289 (1937): "Any person who uses a scientific instrument of great
precision and registers successive observations in an unbiased manner, will invariably find that
the results differ. Only the careless investigator will think that his observations agree. The more
accurate our modes of observation are rendered, the more numerous are the sources of minute
error which will become apparent. We may, in fact, look upon the existence of error in all
measurements as the normal state of things. Experimental results which agree too closely should
raise our suspicions."
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imposed. Nevertheless, the basic unreliability of polygraph evidence re-
mains unchanged, and therefore it should not be admitted over objection 2
And the deficiencies in the "lie detector" hypothesis should be considered
carefully by those who otherwise might be tempted to enter into stipulation
agreements concerning the admissibility of polygraph evidence.
A further objection to the admission of such evidence, in either crim-
inal or civil trials, is that its "deceptive certainty" would tend to confuse
and mislead most jurors (and some judges 3). The "fact" that a witness or
party litigant was truthful or deceitful in answering certain key questions
is clearly relevant evidence which should be considered. But the use of "lie
detector" evidence invites confusion between (1) the reliability of the
objective physiological facts which are recorded by the polygraph, and (2)
the reliability of the subjective inferences of truth or deception which are
drawn from those facts by the examiner. And since the average juror would
probably fail to distinguish the physiological facts from the examiner's
inferences,8 4 polygraph evidence might become virtually decisive of ulti-
mate fact issues."5
It has been suggested that polygraph evidence should be admitted for
limited purposes, such as the proof of subsidiary fact issues and the im-
peachment of witnesses. 8 It has also been suggested that polygraph evi-
82 Even leading polygraph examiners believe that evidence based on "lie detector" examina-
tions should not be admitted at this time. INBAu & Ram 128. See also Harman and Arther,
supra note 78, at 27: "[The polygraph] has not yet reached the stage in its development where
the results should be admitted into evidence over the objection of one of the parties." These
frank admissions result from the examiners' recognition of the fact that: "A premature accept-
ance of the test results as legal evidence would undoubtedly occasion such a series of abuses
and miscarriages of justice as to stigmatize forever the technique in the field of law as well as
sdcience2 INBAu & RE:D 132. There are some commentators who believe that polygraph evidence
should never be admissible. See Gardner, Book Review, 10 STAN. L. RFv. 189, 194 (1957).
83 See notes 3, 16 and 20 suPra.
84 See Commonwealth v. McKinley, 181 Pa. Super. 610, 618, 123 A.2d 735, 739 (1956);
6 STA. L. REv. 172, 176 (1953). See also Stockwell v. State, 301 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Crim. App.
1957) ; Fa, Ax, CouRTs ON TRL. 111-25 (1949).
85 See Koffler, The Lie Detector-A Critical Appraisal of the Technique as a Potential
Undermining Factor in the Judicial Process, 3 N.Y. LAw Foauru 123, 146-54 (1957). See also
39 CA=IF. L. REv. 439, 442 (1951) ; 3 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 999 (3d ed. 1940). The misleading
nature of polygraph evidence has been convincingly demonstrated on at least two occasions. In
People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1938), incriminating evidence based on a poIy-
graph examination was admitted over the defendant's objection. After defendant's conviction,
a polling of the jury revealed that the verdict would have been for acquittal but for the fact
that "the lie detector said he lied." See Forkosch 228-31. Compare Inbau, Detection of Decep-
tion Technique Admitted as Evidence, 26 J. Cman. L. & CRaUxsooGY 262, 268 (1935). Similarly,
in a recent experiment at a New York law school, third year law students displayed the same
myopic attitude by voting to convict a defendant on only fragmentary evidence when it included
testimony that a polygraph examination had indicated deception. See Koffler, supra at 138-43,
145-46.
8 8 E.g., whether or not a confession was voluntary.
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dence could be utilized to reconcile contradictory testimony by opposing
witnesses. It is likely, however, that this last endeavor would merely result
in the judge or jury being forced to evaluate not only the witnesses' testi-
mony, but the conflicting opinions of polygraph examiners as well. For
example, it would not be surprising for examination "results" in such in-
stances to show only that each witness was telling the "truth" in his own
subjective way;" the polygraph, of course, could never detect such "un-
conscious" lying.88 Moreover, in view of the well known fact that limiting
instructions have, at most, a negligible effect, 19 it seems unsound to allow
the admission of polygraph evidence for any purpose in jury trials.90
The legal profession should be eager to applaud the efforts of those who
strive to improve the traditional means of determining truth and decep-
tion.9 But to look to the polygraph examination process for such an im-
provement ascribes to it a degree of reliability and accuracy which it does
not deserve at this time.
87 "Truth ... would then be like flotsam caught in a whirling eddy." Gideon v. Gideon,
153 Cal. App. 2d 541, 547, 314 P.2d 1011, 1014 (1957). See also People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348,
371-72, 72 N.W.2d 269, 282 (1955). The "objective" facts often differ radically from those
indicated by a witness' testimony, which is subject to errors of observation, memory, recollec-
tion and narration, as well as unconscious bias or prejudice. See FRANK & FRANK, NOT GuLT
63-64, 199-214, 219-21 (1957) ; FRANK, CoURTs ON TRiAL 14-21 (1950) ; S6DERaAN & O'CoN-
NExu, MODERN CRInAL INVESTIGATION 35-45 (1952). See also note 41 supra. For a summary
of the possible means of correcting these and other deficiencies and inherent fallibilities of wit-
nesses, see FRANx, supra at 422-23.
88 For a model jury instruction intended to cope with this problem, see Streeter and Belli,
The "Fourth Degree": The Lie Detector, 5 VAND. L. REv. 549, 557 (1952). But see notes 89
and 90 infra and accompanying text.
89 See, e.g., 24 U. Ctn. L. REv. 710 (1957) ; 8 STAN. L. RIv. 451, 455-57 (1956) ; note 85
supra. See also FRANKFURTER, LAW AND Pouncs 167 (1939).
90 Compare Bottoms, The Use of a "Lie Detector" in Marriage Trials, 16 JusrsT 292, 298-
99 (1956).
9 1 See note 2 supra. But see Silving, Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69 HARV.
L. REv. 683, 702 (1956), for an espousal of the thesis that it would derogate the present con-
cept of due process "to abandon our traditional system of adversary litigation with emphasis
on dignity for 'scientific' trial with emphasis upon truth." See also People v. Aragon, 154 Cal.
App. 2d 646, 658, 316 P.2d 370, 378 (1957) ; Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339, 341 (Fla. 1952).
While judicial acceptance of "scientific" devices should be extended cautiously, the tradi-
tionalistic tendency should be tempered with an awareness of the consequences alluded to by
this timely admonition in William Shakespeare's MEASURE FOR MzAsuRE, Act I, Sc. 5:
"Our doubts are traitors
And make us lose the good we oft might win
By fearing to attempt."
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